

30 SEPT 1970

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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
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TRENDS

in Communist Propaganda

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30 September 1970
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TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 21 - 27 SEPTEMBER 1970

Moscow (3870 items)

Luna 16	(5%)	23%
Middle East	(9%)	14%*
Indian President	(0.3%)	5%
Giri in USSR		
Indochina	(8%)	5%
USSR-FRG Treaty	(3%)	3%
China	(3%)	3%
Uruguay CP, 50th Anniversary	(--)	2%

Peking (2912 items)

Jordan	(6%)	39%
Domestic Issues	(35%)	30%
Indochina	(11%)	11%
[DRV Economic	(4%)	6%]
Delegation		
in PRC		
[Cambodia	(3%)	5%]
Mali National Day	(--)	5%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

* This week's volume of Soviet broadcast material on the Middle East is the second highest since the aftermath of the June 1967 war, almost equaling the volume in late February this year which was highlighted by Moscow's extensive campaign of public protests against "criminal" Israeli actions.

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INDOCHINA

At the 24 September session of the Paris talks PRG Foreign Minister Nguyen Thi Binh reviewed the major points of last week's eight-point elaboration of the 10-point PRG/NFLSV position. Both she and DRV delegate Xuan Thuy noted that a U.S. response to the eight points is awaited.

Xuan Thuy again praised the PRG "peace initiative" without noting any of its substance. But belated Hanoi comment--in NHAN DAN Commentator articles on 25 and 28 September--discusses the first point regarding a timetable for U.S. withdrawal and the points on formation of a coalition government in South Vietnam.

Moscow continues to praise the PRG proposal and to criticize the United States for failing to respond. A 27 September dispatch in IZVESTIYA complains that at the Paris session on the 24th Ambassador Bruce did not give a "detailed reply," devoting his speech almost entirely to the prisoner-of-war question. A Mandarin-language broadcast over Radio Peace and Progress on the 28th briefly criticizes the Chinese for failing to report the PRG initiative. (Peking media have mentioned the proposal only in reports on Sihanouk's endorsement of it.)

Hanoi and Peking report that the DRV economic mission to China, headed by Vice Premier Nguyen Con, met with Mao and Lin Piao on 23 September and had what NCNA on 25 September describes as a "long and very friendly talk."

Peking propaganda on Cambodia continues to consist mainly of publicity for pronouncements by the Sihanouk regime, with current statements again denying the Vietnamese communist military presence in Cambodia and arguing the legitimacy of the Sihanouk government. On 30 September NCNA carried a FUNK/RGNU statement on PRC National Day which thanks China for its aid and support and calls the teachings of Mao and Lin Piao on people's war "a contribution of great importance" to the Cambodian struggle.

PARIS TALKS: CALL FOR U.S. ANSWER TO EIGHT-POINT STATEMENT

Mme. Binh's statement at the 85th session of the Paris talks, on 24 September, reviewed the eight-point "elaboration" of the PRG/NFLSV 10 points which she had presented at the previous

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session. She repeated the substance of the first point to the effect that if the United States agrees to total withdrawal of U.S. forces by the end of June 1971, there can be immediate discussion of the security of the withdrawing forces and the release of U.S. prisoners of war. She also reviewed points three through five on the need to form a new Saigon administration and to settle the problem in South Vietnam through elections organized by a provisional coalition government made up of people from the PRG, members of the Saigon administration who "really stand for peace," and others representing different political and religious tendencies.

Hanoi and Front media had underlined the importance of the PRG proposal last week by publicizing full texts of the communist delegates' formal statements at the session, but this week they returned to the usual practice of carrying only summaries. Both the LPA and the VNA summaries report an opening remark by Mme. Binh that she would like to hear the American delegate's comments on her proposal. LPA notes that Mme. Binh maintained that the 30 June deadline for the total withdrawal of U.S. and other foreign allied forces is "reasonable." Both VNA and LPA report her declaration that the proposal on prisoners is an expression of good will and requires a response. Both accounts also note her call for the Nixon Administration to renounce the "Thieu-Ky-Khiem group" and not oppose the formation of a provisional coalition government.

Xuan Thuy's statement, like the one he read last week, is unusually brief and does not mention the substance of the PRG's eight points. The VNA summary details most of his remarks; thus it notes his comment that U.S. public opinion, "including a number of people in American political circles, holds that the Nixon Administration must carefully study and seriously respond to" the "important peace initiative" of the PRG. VNA also reports Xuan Thuy's expression of hope that the U.S. side will give a "positive response."

ALLIED REMARKS VNA says that GVN Ambassador Lam in his statement "again tried to plead for that perfidious, bellicose, and fascist regime and stubbornly opposed the new peace initiative" of the PRG. VNA alleges that Ambassador Bruce registered a "passive reaction" to the eight-point proposal and still "obdurately" demanded a mutual troop withdrawal, still "pleaded" for the "puppet

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administration," and "distorted" the DRV's policy toward the captured U.S. pilots. (The typically brief VNA report of Bruce's remarks thus does not reflect his comment that a review of the eight points reveals that they do not basically alter the communist position and his statement that "if you intended to convey new positions, we would welcome further clarification from you.")

The U.S. statement at the 85th session is also deprecated in Hanoi comment, including the 25 and 28 September NHAN DAN Commentator articles. A 26 September Hanoi radio commentary devotes the most attention to Ambassador Bruce's remarks, scoring his comments on mutual withdrawal, self-determination, and prisoners of war and claiming that he "uttered slander" when charging that the PRG was imposing "preconditions" for negotiations. A similar denial that the PRG is raising preconditions appears in a 27 September Liberation Radio commentary, in a brief allusion to the U.S. statement at the 85th session.

DRV, PRG COMMENT The 25 September NHAN DAN Commentator
ON EIGHT POINTS article offers Hanoi's first substantive
comment on the PRG's eight points, in
the course of its discussion of the communist demand for a
total and unconditional U.S. withdrawal. (A Hanoi radio
commentary on the 19th made no reference to the PRG proposal
when it cited numerous calls in U.S. political circles for
a fixed timetable for a total U.S. withdrawal.)

As reported by VNA, the 25 September Commentator article:
does not mention the 30 June 1971 date offered as a
deadline for U.S. withdrawal; but it details other
aspects of the first point, claiming that this point
accommodates "legitimate demands" for a withdrawal "in a
given period of time" as well as U.S. concern about the
fate of the American soldiers serving in Vietnam and
under detention there. The 26 September Hanoi radio
commentary, in criticizing the U.S. stand, does specifically
demand a withdrawal by 30 June 1971. Typically, it also
quotes at some length from U.S. critics of Administration
policies.*

* In following the progress of U.S. dissent, Hanoi is known to
have mentioned the 1 September defeat of the McGovern-Hatfield
amendment--calling for a U.S. withdrawal by the end of 1971--only
in a 6 September broadcast in Vietnamese to South Vietnam,
stressing the continued determination of congressional critics.

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The NHAN DAN Commentator article on the 28th deals with "another basic key problem" involved in a settlement--the "realization of the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination." In addition to aiming a diatribe at the GVN, a "big obstacle" to the peaceful settlement of the Vietnam problem, the article reviews the "very correct, fair, reasonable" stand of the NFLSV/PRG. It notes the major points in Mme. Binh's proposal concerning a political settlement in the South: that a new administration should be formed in Saigon--excluding Thieu, Ky, and Khiem--which could then talk with the PRG and that a provisional coalition government should be established with representatives of three major elements, including the PRG and the "Saigon administration."

A 25 September LPA commentary, defending the demand in the 10 points and the eight points for a total U.S. withdrawal, alleges that "recently," after the release of Mme. Binh's statement "elaborating on a number of points of the 10-point overall solution, several U.S. senators said these proposals are acceptable." It adds that "on the contrary, the Nixon Administration, through its spokesman, has declared that it is impossible to announce a timetable for the troop withdrawal."

Both Hanoi and the Front publicize reports noting the favorable reception of Mme. Binh's proposal among organizations in North and South Vietnam.

MOSCOW SUPPORTS PRG EIGHT-POINT PROPOSAL

Moscow continues to praise the PRG's eight-point proposal in routine-level comment and to criticize Ambassador Bruce's initial statement that the proposal "contains nothing new." A dispatch from Paris correspondent Zykov, published in IZVESTIYA on 27 September, says that at the 24 September session Ambassador Bruce, instead of giving the promised "detailed reply" to Mme. Binh's proposal, devoted his speech almost entirely to the prisoner-of-war question in order to sidetrack the session from the "main question"--the withdrawal of U.S. and allied troops.

Other comment includes a 24 September Shchedrov PRAVDA article, reviewed by TASS and broadcast in Vietnamese, which says that the PRG initiative "opens up new possibilities for overcoming the deadlock at Paris." Shchedrov asserts that

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the proposal gives a "clear answer to questions that have been raised at the talks," particularly on the issues of a schedule for troop withdrawal, the release of prisoners of war, and the formation of a provisional coalition government. Nevertheless, he says, the United States "stubbornly persists in its old aggressive policy." Moscow propaganda continues to cite statements by various U.S. senators, including Fulbright, Muskie, and Cooper, calling for a careful study of the proposal.

A Mandarin-language broadcast over Radio Peace and Progress on 28 September criticizes the PRC for having failed to report the PRG initiative.* It adds that this is not the first time the PRC "has maintained silence or has taken an extremely negative attitude toward peace proposals of the DRV, the PRG, and other countries"--behavior the radio attributes to the fact that "any constructive peace proposal which might ease the international situation or lessen the possibility of world war is contrary to Peking's slogan on war preparations." The commentary is consistent with past Moscow criticism of Peking for ignoring the Paris talks. For example, a radio commentary in Mandarin on 18 May 1969, some 10 days after the announcement of the 10-point program, took the Chinese to task for their silence and "negative attitude" toward the talks.

HANOI COMMENT ON ABORTIVE NGUYEN CAO KY VISIT TO WASHINGTON

Hanoi reacts on 29 September to GVN Vice President Ky's 26 September announcement that he will not attend the "March for Victory" rally in Washington on 3 October. A broadcast on the 29th claims that President Nixon and Ky are "panic-stricken in the face of the U.S. antiwar movement" and that the President could do nothing but prevent Ky from making the trip. The broadcast acknowledges Ky's presence in Paris, noting that his decision was made public after he arrived there. It does not take note of Ky's

* Peking media have mentioned the eight points only in publicizing a brief 18 September statement from Sihanouk's government supporting the PRG proposal. It was reported by NCNA on the 23d and broadcast by Peking radio.

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additional remark, in the "Face the Nation" telecast taped on the 26th, that he still intends to visit the United States in the near future.

Examining the motives for Ky's originally planned trip, the broadcast claims that he wanted to make President Nixon trust him more than Thieu with an eye to the 1971 South Vietnamese presidential election. He also sought, according to the broadcast, to "avoid being ousted from the ranks of the Vietnamese traitors" in the face of the PRG's eight-point proposal and the "movement" in South Vietnamese "temporarily-controlled areas" to "support this proposal and demand the overthrow of the Thieu-Ky-Khiem clique."

The first known Hanoi reference to the possibility that Ky might come to Washington had appeared on 23 September in a brief radio item which noted opposition by U.S. senators and plans for counterdemonstrations by "progressive student organizations."

SIHANOUK DENIES VIETNAMESE PRESENCE, PRESSES RGNU LEGITIMACY

In several statements Sihanouk again denies the presence of Viet Cong or North Vietnamese troops in Cambodia. A statement by his private secretariat--dated 15 September but not carried by NCNA until the 24th and apparently ignored by VNA* and the FUNK Radio--denounces the Lon Nol/Sirik Matak "clique" for its "shameful lies" about support from the seven million Khmers and for branding members of the FUNK and the Cambodian National Liberation Army "Viet Cong," "North Vietnamese invaders," and "even Pathet Lao." The statement once again cites Western correspondents' reports that the fighters are Khmer, not

* VNA had similarly ignored Sihanouk's "special message to the Khmer Buddhist monks," carried by NCNA on the 20th and by the FUNK radio from the 20th to the 22d, in which he denounced charges of "imaginary" Vietnamese aggression in Cambodia but at the same time cited Western press references to the Viet Cong presence. VNA has previously reported Sihanouk denials of the Vietnamese presence and normally carries Sihanouk's messages.

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Vietnamese. It quotes a FRANCE-SOIR correspondent as saying that the presence of Vietnamese in the Cambodian "liberation forces" can be explained by the fact that 600,000 Vietnamese have lived in Cambodia for several generations, some of them having never been in Vietnam.

Sihanouk's "eighth message to the Khmer nation"--carried by NCNA on 25 September and by the FUNK radio on the 27th, but apparently also ignored by VNA--similarly cites reports by Western correspondents to demonstrate that the fighting is being carried on by Khmer "patriots" and not by Viet Cong as claimed by the "clique" in Phnom Penh.

Other official statements continue to press the legitimacy of the RGNU and the illegality of the Lon Nol government. A RGNU statement on the 25th session of the UNGA--dated 15 September, carried by NCNA on the 24th and by the FUNK radio on the 26th and summarized by VNA on the 28th--reaffirms that the RGNU is the sole, legal government of Cambodia and condemns the United States for violating the UN Charter and international law by engineering the coup against Sihanouk and invading Cambodia. The statement criticizes the United Nations for failing to react to "massacres" in Cambodia which Sihanouk brought to U Thant's attention, and it denounces the procedure of the Secretary General who, it says, decided without consulting member governments to regard the Lon Nol/Sirik Matak/Cheng Heng regime as the government of Cambodia. The statement argues that the Phnom Penh regime violates the principles of the UN Charter and, being "completely isolated internationally," has no right to occupy the Cambodian seat.

A Sihanouk statement carried by NCNA on 29 September condemns the Lon Nol regime's alleged plan to "impose a 'republican constitution'" on Cambodia and cautions other countries against recognizing a Cambodian "republic." The statement warns governments "friendly to" the United States of "the very grave, inevitable consequences of their official or de jure recognition of the forthcoming 'republic'" and calls the attention of "European, African, and Asian monarchies" to the "regicide" entailed in repudiation of the Royal Constitution of 1947. It also calls the attention of "the socialist states and governments which refuse to recognize the government of the Khmer people struggling against U.S. imperialism and the anticommunist regimes of Saigon and Phnom Penh" to the anticommunist, pro-imperialist beliefs of "the sham republican regime of Lon Nol."

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RGNU MINISTERS A 20 September statement by the three RGNU
IN CAMBODIA ministers who are said to be in Cambodia--
 Khieu Samphan, Hou Yuon, and Hu Nim--was
carried by the FUNK radio on the 25th and summarized by VNA
on the 30th. Expressing the resolve of the Cambodian liberation
armed forces to destroy all enemies and smash the "Lon Nol/Sirik
Matak clique," the statement calls upon all "officials and high
personages," soldiers, and policemen working with the Phnom Penh
administration to leave the "traitors" and join the FUNK.

The three ministers have issued joint statements on several
occasions in the past. VNA publicized their statements on
20 July condemning the trial in absentia of Sihanouk, on
9 May hailing the summit conference of the Indochinese peoples,
and on 10 April supporting Sihanouk's 23 March appeal. They
were identified as leaders of the Pracheachon--the Cambodian
communist front organization which dates back to 1955--in
Sihanouk's "open letter" to leaders of nonaligned countries,
publicized by MCNA from 9 through 14 August. The letter also
claimed that the Pracheachon had agreed to join the FUNK the
day after Sihanouk's overthrow.

Available communist propaganda has not acknowledged an AFP
interview with Sihanouk in Peking on 25 September in which
he reportedly said that the three ministers and seven
recently appointed vice ministers* who are allegedly in
Cambodia are not "Sihanoukists" but "Red Khmers." Sihanouk
was quoted by AFP as commenting that it is these officials in
Cambodia, not the ones in Peking, who really govern and
that the "majority" of the RGNU is now "Red Khmer" and
"the power already belongs to the Cambodian Communist
Party."

* The appointment of the seven vice-ministers is reported
in the 23 September TRENDS, pages 10-11. A FUNK Central
Committee meeting at which proposals were approved concerning
"enlargement of the responsibilities" of the resistance leaders
in Cambodia is discussed in the 26 August TRENDS, page 8.

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RGNU DELEGATION
TO NORTH KOREA

The RGNU delegation led by Dr. Ngo Hou, minister of public health, religious, and social affairs, which arrived in North Korea on 17 September at the invitation of the DPRK Government, left Pyongyang on the 29th, according to KCNA. Kim Il-song received the group for a "cordial talk" on the 26th, and on the 28th the delegation was entertained at a banquet by the RGNU Ambassador.

Ngo Hou pointed out in a banquet speech that Kim Il-song had given the delegation useful advice "about land reform, agricultural cooperativization, and the socialist transformation of private trade and industry"--the subjects, Ngo Hou said, of the delegation's study. He added that Cambodia will apply the "valuable experiences" of Korea "when she is liberated."

HANOI REVIEWS SIX MONTHS OF "VICTORIES" IN CAMBODIA

The sixth-month anniversary of Sihanouk's 23 March call for a "liberation struggle" to overthrow the Lon Nol government is used by Hanoi as a peg to review the Cambodian military situation. A QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial of the 25th, carried the same day by Hanoi radio, refers in general terms to successes of the Cambodian "patriotic forces" but observes that "a revolution is always a long process." The army paper maintains that the Cambodian resistance must go through "many difficult, complex phases in order to eliminate all obstacles and to gradually change the balance of forces and achieve superiority over the U.S. aggressors and their lackeys."

On the 23d VNA had cited AKI in claiming that within the past six months nearly 110,000 enemy troops--including 38,000 American and Saigon troops--were wiped out and that more than two-thirds of Cambodia and nearly three million people had been "liberated." Taking note of action this month, the VNA report said that "heavy losses" were inflicted on eight government battalions sent in early September to relieve pressures on Kompong Thom town. It claimed that six government battalions mustered on the 19th and 20th to rescue the besieged troops were themselves surrounded and that "at present on the Highway 6, . . . 14 battalions of the Lon Nol army are under heavy pressure from the liberation forces."

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VIETNAM ALLIANCE GROUP CONCLUDES TOUR OF HUNGARY, USSR, PRC

A July-September tour by a delegation of the Vietnam Alliance of National, Democratic, and Peace Forces concluded on 23 September with the announcement that the group, led by Alliance President Trinh Dinh Thao, had left China for home. The delegation, which visited Hungary, the USSR, and the PRC, was most warmly received during its stay in China.

HUNGARY The Thao delegation's travels began on 22 July when it appeared in Peking for a brief stopover en route to Hungary. It arrived in Budapest on 28 July at the invitation of the Hungarian Patriotic People's Front. The delegation's "friendship visit" in Hungary lasted almost a month, ending on 26 August. Trinh Dinh Thao, who is also a vice chairman of the PRG Advisory Council, and other delegation members were feted and received by Hungarian Front and government leaders, including Gyula Kallai, president of the Hungarian National Assembly and president of the Hungarian Front, and Lajos Feher, vice chairman of the Council of Ministers.

USSR The Alliance delegation arrived in Moscow on 26 August, again on a "friendship visit," at the invitation of the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee. The delegation was met at the airport by officials of the Solidarity Committee, and many of its activities involved the committee or other Soviet mass organizations. The group was officially received on 31 August by Y. S. Nasriddinova, president of the Soviet of Nationalities of the Supreme Soviet, according to a 4 September LPA report.

On the 7th LPA noted that on 3 September, the day before the visit ended, the delegation had a "cordial" talk with N. P. Firyubin, vice minister for foreign affairs. (Moscow media are not known to have mentioned the meeting with Firyubin, but TASS on 3 September did report that Firyubin on that day saw off PRG Foreign Minister Nguyen Thi Binh, who had been in the Soviet capital since 29 August. If the Alliance delegation was also present at the airport, it was not listed by TASS.)

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Interviews with Trinh Dinh Thao were published in IZVESTIYA on 5 September and in PRAVDA on the 7th, IZVESTIYA noting that the delegation had "fruitful meetings and talks with prominent Soviet political and public figures, visited industrial enterprises, and took part in the ceremonial assemblies and meetings" marking DRV National Day and the anniversary of Ho Chi Minh's death, as well as attending an enlarged session of the Central Board of the Soviet-Vietnamese Friendship Society. TASS, reporting on Thao's interview in PRAVDA, remarked that he was leading the first Alliance delegation to visit the Soviet Union.

CHINA The delegation returned to Peking on 5 September, HCHN noting that it was in China "on invitation" for a "friendly visit." The group was met at the airport by Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien, who gave a banquet for its members on the 7th. Also on the 7th, Thao and his wife reportedly met with Sihanouk and his wife. Kuo Mo-jo, vice chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, attended an 8 September banquet given for the delegation by the PRG and DRV ambassadors; and on the 9th the delegation had a "cordial and friendly" talk with PRC Vice Chairman Tung Pi-wu. During its 22-26 July stopover in Peking on the way to Hungary, the delegation had also had a "cordial and friendly" talk with Chou En-lai.*

The delegation toured Chinese provinces from 10 to 23 September and left for home from Nanning, according to HCHN.

LAOS: SOUPHANOUVONG'S SPECIAL ENVOY RETURNS TO SAM NEUA

The return to Sam Neua of Tiao Souk Vongsak, Souphanouvong's special envoy to Souvanna Phouma, on 28 September was reported by Pathet Lao radio the following day. Souk had arrived in Vientiane on 31 July to make preparations for talks on a Laotian settlement between plenipotentiaries of the two princes. Before his departure, he released a

* See the 29 July TRENDS, page 12, for a review of the delegation's July stopover in Peking.

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press communique, carried by Radio Pathet Lao on 25 September, in which he reiterated the NLMS complaint that by appointing a "government delegation" Souvanna Phouma had gone back on his 25 June proposal, accepted by Souphanouvong, that plenipotentiaries of the princes meet at Khang Khay. The communique recalled that Souphanouvong sent a message to Souvanna on 20 September complaining that Souvanna had not answered an earlier message of 30 August in which Souphanouvong announced the nomination of his plenipotentiary. The press communique said that since Souvanna Phouma has gone abroad, Souk was returning to Sam Neua to report to Souphanouvong and request instructions.

Like Souphanouvong's 20 September message, the press communique made no mention of the fact that on 29 August Souvanna Phouma had sent a message to Tiao Souk Vongsak naming Pheng Phongsavan, the head of his "government delegation," as his plenipotentiary for talks in Vientiane during his absence. The communique also failed to note that Souk met with Pheng on 22 September. According to the Vientiane domestic service on the 23d, Souk paid an "official" call on Pheng at noon the day before. This differed from an 8 September meeting between the two which, according to Vientiane, was held at Pheng's residence during nonworking hours, Souk not wishing to recognize Pheng's official status in the Vientiane government. The earlier meeting was similarly unreported in Pathet Lao media.

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MIDDLE EAST

Moscow radio's first reference to President Nasir's death on 28 September came some 13 hours after the Cairo announcement, in a 15-minute domestic service program devoted solely to Nasir. The broadcast included the announcement that Kosygin would head the delegation to the funeral as well as the text of the condolence message to the UAR Government and people which reaffirmed the USSR policy of aid and support, hailed Nasir's efforts for a political settlement of the Middle East conflict, and appealed for unity among the Arab states.

Moscow radio's first foreign-language commentary on Nasir's death notes that his last hours were devoted to halting the conflict in Jordan. Moscow had attentively followed the developments in the efforts of Arab leaders, meeting in Cairo, to resolve the Jordanian-Palestinian conflict, crediting them with an important role in normalizing the situation.

Soviet diplomatic contacts--with the West, Arab states and the United Nations--regarding the conflict in Jordan had been summed up in a seemingly unique "report" by the Soviet Foreign Ministry, issued by TASS on the 23d and published in PRAVDA the following day. Followup comment cited foreign reaction welcoming the Soviet "diplomatic initiatives" and took credit for the "enormous role" these "energetic efforts" played in helping ease the conflict. Propaganda has echoed the language in the Foreign Ministry report in urging caution, at the same time calling attention to the "dangerous" U.S. military preparations--a threat Moscow on the 28th said had been "warded off but is not over"--and to "provocative" Israeli statements and actions indicating a desire to intervene.

Moscow continues to express concern at the status of the Jarring mission and to highlight UAR efforts to achieve a political settlement, in spite of Israeli "obstruction" of the New York contacts and Washington's "duplicity" in its Middle East policy through its "encouragement" of Tel Aviv by supplying further arms and economic aid. Comment continues to stress that the basis for a settlement should be complete fulfillment of the November 1967 Security Council resolution, and some propaganda repeats the call for Israeli withdrawal from "all" occupied territories, along with reaffirmations of Israel's right to exist.

KOSYGIN LEADS SOVIET DELEGATION TO NASIR FUNERAL

Approximately an hour after Cairo's announcement at 2000 GMT of the death of President Nasir on 28 September, TASS' international services in English and Russian reported the death, citing the

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MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY (MENA) and noting that the announcement was made over Cairo radio and television by Vice President as-Sadat. But Soviet domestic media did not carry the announcement until 0900 GMT on the 29th, when Moscow radio broadcast a 15-minute program in its Russian-language services devoted exclusively to Nasir.

This initial Moscow broadcast followed the death announcement with a biography of Nasir, the condolence messages from Brezhnev, Podgornyy, and Kosygin--to Acting President as-Sadat, the UAR Government and National Assembly, the Arab Socialist Union, and the UAR people, and to Nasir's widow--and the announcement that Kosygin would attend the funeral.* TASS on the 29th also reported that Podgornyy, Kosygin, Polyanskiy, Suslov, Gromyko, and Zakharov had called at the UAR Embassy in Moscow and conveyed condolences to the UAR ambassador. (Brezhnev's absence may have been related to his departure for Baku, where he arrived on the 30th for anniversary celebrations of the Azerbaydzhani republic and party.) A half-hour Moscow Arabic-language broadcast at 1230 GMT on the 29th, devoted entirely to Nasir's death, carried all of these items plus a roundup of official actions taken in the UAR and the texts of condolences from Gromyko to Foreign Minister Riyad and from Marshal Grechko to Muhammad Fawzi.

CONDOLENCES FROM MOSCOW The format of the initial Moscow broadcast on Nasir's death dramatized Soviet concern to reaffirm a policy toward the UAR based on close friendship, economic and military aid, and support for Nasir's line on a political settlement: The third item in the broadcast--following the death announcement and biography of Nasir--consisted of the last part of the Soviet leaders' condolence message which contained this reaffirmation. Having thus highlighted the reassertion of policy, the broadcast went on to carry the full text of the condolence message as its fourth item.

The message began by expressing grief at the loss of the "appointed leader of the national liberation movement and great friend of the Soviet Union," then briefly paid tribute to Nasir's

* An hour and a half after Cairo's announcement of Nasir's death, the Cairo domestic service reported that the Soviet charge d'affaires had called on as-Sadat to convey condolences and informed him that Kosygin would attend the funeral.

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role in the 1952 revolution, the tripartite "aggression" against Egypt in 1956, the 1967 war, and the "liberation movement" of the Arab peoples. The concluding portion reaffirmed the Soviet "course toward the development of all-round relations with the UAR, toward the defense of the Arab people's interests in their just anti-imperialist struggle, and toward the strengthening of their independence, economic, and defense potential." It pledged that the USSR will continue giving support to the Arab peoples' national liberation movement. Friendly Soviet-Egyptian relations, to which Nasir attached "prime importance," the message added, contribute to the Arab people's mobilization of their forces in the struggle for the liberation of the occupied Arab territories and to the establishment of a just and stable peace in the Middle East.

Underscoring Moscow's long-expressed lines on the need for a political course toward a Middle East settlement and the need for Arab unity on an "anti-imperialist" basis, the message in effect advised Nasir's successors to sustain such positions: The line directed toward a political settlement of the conflict, "whose convinced champion was the late President Nasir, will continue having our all-round support," it said. Nasir, it declared, was "a tested and consistent fighter against imperialism. Therefore, the best perpetuation of his memory will be by closing ranks of Arab states in their struggle against imperialism and strengthening their unity."

Soviet broadcast media on the 29th also report expressions of condolence by Soviet public organizations--trade unions, friendship societies, peace committee, Afro-Asian solidarity committee--to their UAR counterparts. The messages dwell on Nasir's "anti-imperialist" policy and his support for friendly relations and cooperation with the Soviet Union, one stressing his advocacy of a political settlement of the Middle East conflict, another urging Arab workers to strengthen their "anti-imperialist" unity, and a third expressing the Soviet people's "unbending resolution" to strengthen friendship, solidarity and cooperation with the Egyptian people.

KOSYGIN Kosygin's departure for Cairo was reported by TASS
ARRIVAL on the 29th, which noted that the delegation
 included First Deputy Defense Minister Zakharov,
Deputy Foreign Minister Vinogradov, Army General Lashchenko,
Colonel-General Okunev, and the Soviet charge in Cairo Polyakov.

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TASS added that UAR Ambassador Ghaleb was among those seeing off the delegation. In his arrival remarks--reported by the domestic service late on the 29th, and briefly by TASS the following morning--Kosygin paid tribute to Nasir and in conclusion expressed confidence that the Soviet Union and the UAR would continue to "follow a common path of friendship, all-round political and economic cooperation, and joint struggle against imperialism and aggression, for peace and security of peoples."

MENA on the 30th reported that Kosygin met with as-Sadat for 50 minutes in a condolence call. According to TASS, Kosygin met with as-Sadat, Husayn ash-Shafii, Ali Sabri, and Muhammad Fawzi; during his "cordial" talk with as-Sadat, TASS added, the two "leaders" expressed a "mutual desire to strengthen the existing close friendly relations" between the USSR and the UAR. TASS reported that Kosygin also visited Nasir's widow and members of his family.

MOSCOW COMMENT The first foreign-language commentary, by Tsoppi on the 29th, also hails Nasir for the establishment of "sincere friendship and fruitful cooperation" between the UAR and the USSR, relations which he says have "now changed into a very important factor in the political development in the Middle East." In noting that Nasir's last hours were devoted to halting the conflict in Jordan, Tsoppi adds that it is necessary to insure that the Husayn-Arafat agreements are carried out and necessary, as well, to establish peace in the Middle East.

Like the Soviet leaders' condolence message, which he cites, Tsoppi stresses that Nasir regarded UAR friendship with the Soviet Union as "a very important factor in helping to find a peaceful solution" of the Middle East conflict, and pledges the USSR to continued support for a political settlement, as "championed" by Nasir. The first commentary broadcast by Moscow's Arabic service, on the 29th, similarly praises Nasir's achievements in establishing UAR-Soviet friendship and cooperation, his "anti-imperialist" struggle, his efforts for Arab unity, and his belief in a Middle East political settlement.

KUO MO-JO REPRESENTS PEKING AT NASIR FUNERAL

The PRC's representative to attend Nasir's funeral, Kuo Mo-jo, left Peking on 29 September in the same plane as delegations representing Prince Sihanouk's government-in-exile and the DPRK.

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Kuo, a vice chairman of the National People's Congress, frequently represents the PRC in relations with noncommunist countries. The Cambodian delegation was headed by Penn Nouth, premier in Sihanouk's government, and the DPRK delegation was led by Kang Yang-uk, a vice president of the North Korean parliament.

Peking's initial reaction to Nasir's death came in a condolence message on the 29th from PRC Vice Chairman Tung Pi-wu (acting in the absence of a chief of state) and Premier Chou En-lai. The message lauds Nasir for leading the UAR in struggles against the United States and Israel, for supporting the Palestinian national liberation struggle and "the Indochinese peoples' struggle" against the United States, and for having made "important contributions" to Arab and Afro-Asian unity. There is no reference to Nasir's relations with the PRC. (In their condolence messages, DPRK Premier Kim Il-song and DRV President Ton Duc Thang praised Nasir's contributions to friendly relations between the UAR and their respective countries.)

EAST EUROPE MEDIA PUBLICIZE CONDOLENCES, EULOGIES OF NASIR

The Soviet bloc regimes in Eastern Europe have marked Nasir's death with messages of condolences, in two cases with official days of mourning, and with commemorative articles generally underscoring--except in the case of Romania--the late Arab leader's close ties with the USSR and the socialist countries.

Hungary's Presidential Council Chairman Pal Losonczi is the highest ranking Soviet bloc leader to head a delegation to the funeral--his delegation also includes the defense minister--followed by Romanian Premier Maurer and Czechoslovak Premier Strougal. East Germany announced that its delegation would be led by Politburo member Verner and People's Chamber President Goetting; Poland sent State Council Vice President Loga-Sowinski; and Bulgaria sent a delegation led by Deputy Premier Zhivko Zhivkov.

East Berlin radio reported on 29 September that the GDR Government had decreed 1 October a day of mourning, and ADN reported that Foreign Minister Winzer "has assured the UAR

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ambassador of the GDR's firm partnership in the fight against imperialism and expressed his conviction of the unity and solidarity of the Arab peoples." A Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU commentary on 29 September, underscoring Nasir's close ties to the Soviet Union and its allies, mentioned that his untimely death had aborted plans for him to visit Poland. Budapest's MAGYAR HIRLAP on the same day, reviewed by MTI, commented that "on his most recent journey abroad President Nasir visited the Soviet Union, and it was proven then that the views of this outstanding personality of the Arab world in many respects are identical with the foreign policy views of the socialist countries on international issues." And Radio Prague on the 29th, also emphasizing Nasir's close cooperation with the Soviet Union, described him as "the leading personality in the efforts to achieve a political solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict."

Radio Bucharest, reporting on 29 September that all the Romanian newspapers that day carried articles on Nasir's death, announced that 1 October had been declared a day of mourning and that the Romanian flag would be flown at half-mast. Sustaining Romania's scrupulous neutrality in the Arab-Israeli conflict, Radio Bucharest's obituary on 29 September mentioned neither the conflict nor Nasir's relations with the Soviet Union, describing him as "an outstanding statesman, a remarkable political personality, steadfast fighter for implementation of the aspirations of his people and for national independence and economic and social progress."

YUGOSLAVIA President Tito, sending his close associate and Council of the Federation member Edvard Kardelj as his representative to the funeral, led a special commemorative meeting of the Federal Executive Council on the 29th at which, according to Radio Belgrade, he warmly praised Nasir's contributions to nonalignment and the Arab world. Following Tito's address, Premier Ribicic had the task of proposing Kardelj to lead the delegation to the funeral. The Council declared 29 September a day of mourning. The Yugoslav press gave Nasir's death voluminous coverage, with BORBA underscoring the UAR's "determined" pursuit of nonalignment. TANYUG commented that "all Belgraders are remembering all of the visits paid by President Nasir to their capital, from the one on 13 June 1956 when he was proclaimed an honorary citizen of Yugoslavia's capital."

ALBANIA Reviewing the Albanian press on the 29th, Tirana's ATA noted that the papers carried a MENA report of Nasir's death. On the same day Radio Tirana broadcast a message of condolences from President Lleshi and Premier Shehu to Acting President as-Sadat urging the Arab people to strengthen their unity "in the struggle against the imperialist Israeli aggressors."

There is no available Albanian comment so far, and no Albanian

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FOREIGN MINISTRY "REPORT" OUTLINES DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES

The 23 September USSR Foreign Ministry report--in the first known formal detailing in this fashion of Soviet diplomatic activity--announces that its embassies in Amman, Damascus, and Baghdad were "instructed" to establish contacts with the respective leaders and that the Soviet side expressed confidence that everything should be done to end the fratricidal fighting in Jordan, which would only play into the hands of "forces not interested in establishing peace" in the Middle East. Subsequent comment has noted that "a number" of Arab countries were informed of the Soviet conviction of the need for an immediate end to the clashes in Jordan.* But Moscow nowhere touches on the reasons why Syria and Iraq were singled out for contacts. The Foreign Ministry report added that "permanent contact" was being maintained with President Nasir on Jordanian developments.

The report indicated that the U.S.-Soviet contacts were initiated in view of the "increasing concentration" of Sixth Fleet forces in the eastern Mediterranean and "other war preparations." The Soviet Government, the report said, called the attention of the U.S. Government to the need for all states to display caution in connection with the complicated situation in the Middle East, and to the fact that any outside interference in the Jordanian events would further complicate the Middle East situation and the international situation as a whole. It was "also stressed," the report added, that the U.S. Government "could use its influence" with Israel so that the latter "might not try to exploit" the Jordanian events "for its aggressive aims." Moscow has emphasized these points in followup comment, and a Tsoppi foreign-language commentary on the 28th, praising the USSR's "positive role," says the Soviet political approaches, along with the actions by "public circles of many countries,"

* Moscow has not acknowledged a Kosygin letter to Algerian President Boumedienne, reported by Algiers radio on the 23d, which stated that the Soviet ambassador had handed the message to Algerian Foreign Minister Bouteflika in a meeting which "also dealt" with the Jordanian situation. Baghdad's domestic service reported on the 24th that the Iraqi ambassador in Algiers had met with the Soviet ambassador, who explained the Soviet "warning to the United States" against intervention, and that he had also met with the PRC ambassador, who "expressed his country's willingness" to support the Palestinian revolution.

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have surely been effective since "American troops on alert at NATO bases have stayed put."

In informing the British of the Soviet views, the Foreign Ministry report said, the Soviet side expressed the hope that Great Britain "would not permit interference" in the internal affairs of countries of the area. The French were simply said to have been contacted for an "exchange of opinions and information" on steps taken by each side, and the Soviet UN mission was said to be keeping in contact with the Secretary General and Security Council member missions.

The report concluded that "necessary steps" would be taken to help end the conflict in Jordan and prevent outside intervention, a point also repeated in subsequent comment without further explanation.

REPORTAGE ON JORDANIAN DEVELOPMENTS STRESSES ARAB ROLE

Moscow warmly welcomed the efforts of the Arab leaders, meeting in Cairo, to resolve the Jordanian conflict, pointing out that the Arab countries have a "special responsibility" not to waste their strength in fighting between brothers. Moscow has given extensive coverage to events related to the Jordanian situation: On the 23d, for example, it noted continued fighting, the first use of the Jordanian air force, the arrival in Amman of the Arab delegation led by Sudanese President an-Numayri for contacts with Husayn and Arafat, and the conclusion of the Arab leaders' meeting in Cairo that the Palestinian resistance organizations should work out a "single political position." TASS reported that Husayn and an-Numayri, speaking over Amman radio, said agreement had been reached on ending the war, but it added that the Palestinian resistance movement in a broadcast from Damascus said the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) had turned down the proposal on a cease-fire.

On the 25th, reports noted, among other things, that the an-Numayri delegation had arrived in Amman for a second visit, and that a cease-fire agreement had been concluded after an-Numayri's talks with Husayn and Arafat. Commenting on the resignation, while in Cairo, of Jordanian Prime Minister Dawud--appointed by Husayn on the 16th to head a military government--Moscow's domestic service observed that the resignation was the result of a "unanimous collective demarche"

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of the Arab leaders, meeting in Cairo, and that Dawud had said that he resigned "to open the way to setting up a civilian government."

TASS on the 26th reported the an-Numayri delegation's return to Cairo late on the 25th with Arafat, and the Sudanese President's report to the Arab leaders at an emergency session, Nasir's message to Husayn accusing the "Jordanian troops" of waging a war for complete extermination of the Palestinian national movement, and Husayn's reply declaring that the army was observing the cease-fire and that the situation had returned to normal "with the exception of separate cases when 'subversive elements are trying to frustrate the cease-fire agreement.'" Husayn, TASS reported, said that a new government would be formed soon. TASS went on to note Palestinian accusations that the Jordanian "military authorities" were repeatedly violating the cease-fire.

On the 26th, TASS noted that the new Jordanian Government headed by Tuqan, which includes eight civilians and four persons from the short-lived military government, had been urged by Husayn to do everything possible to achieve a return to normality. PRAVDA's Cairo correspondent Glukhov, in a dispatch datelined the 27th and published in the paper the next day, said that after Husayn notified Nasir on the 26th that he would be arriving in Cairo, the Arab leaders discussed his participation in the consultations. Sudan's an-Numayri and Libya's Qadhdhafi were opposed, Glukhov said, but after Arafat said that the Palestinians had no objections, a "positive decision was approved" and Qadhdhafi agreed to remain, despite Libya's severance of relations with Jordan.

Moscow reportage on the 27th included the announcement of Husayn's arrival in Cairo that day and the signing of an agreement by nine heads of state and government--including Husayn--and by Arafat. A domestic service commentary on the 28th said that violation of the agreement by one of the contracting parties would entail collective measures against it by all the signatories of the agreement. The broadcast noted that the first hundred army officers from five Arab countries had arrived in Amman to check the implementation of the agreement, and that the Jordanian conflict was on the way to being solved. TASS on the 28th said the Cairo press hailed the agreement but expressed concern that tensions remained.

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The TASS report said that the agreement provided for the immediate ending of the conflict, the withdrawal of Jordanian troops and Palestinian forces from Amman, and the formation of a special committee chaired by Tunisian Premier. Ladgham for implementing the agreement. The agreement, according to TASS, also provided for the cessation of "propaganda campaigns"; Moscow noted in Arabic on the 28th that reports from Beirut said the PLO central committee broadcasts from Baghdad and Damascus against the Jordanian Government had been suspended following the Cairo agreement.

On the 29th, TASS reported the situation was "gradually being stabilized"; while "separate shots" were still heard from time to time in Amman, they were becoming less frequent, and life in the city was returning to normal.

NASIR ROLE Nasir had been the subject of high praise in
IN SETTLEMENT a 24 September Arabic-language broadcast which pointed to the "great part" played by the UAR, and "the role of President Nasir personally," in solving the Middle East crisis. Noting that Nasir had more than once referred to the "peaceful essence of his country's policy," the broadcast declared the Soviet Union "highly appreciates" the attitude of the UAR Government, and "that of President Nasir personally," for continuing to make efforts to secure the success of "every initiative" aimed at a just peaceful settlement of the Middle East crisis. The broadcast also applauded the UAR Government's "positive, active efforts" to normalize the situation in Jordan, adding that UAR policy as a whole for more than three years proves that Cairo defends the national interests not only of its people but of all the Arabs, and that the opinions voiced by Cairo "and by President Nasir personally" enjoy a "great and satisfactory reputation, whether regarding Arab or international affairs."

U.S. AID TASS and Moscow domestic service reports on the
TO JORDAN 26th cited State Department spokesman McCloskey as saying that Jordan had asked the United States for foodstuffs and that it had received a "positive reply." The same reports noted that Deputy Defense Secretary Packard had told newsmen that the United States intends to replenish Jordanian army losses in equipment as a result of the armed clashes with guerrillas. In an article in the 28 September PRAVDA; Orestov, charging that the concentration of U.S. armed forces in the Middle East cannot help alleviate tension, said

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that "moreover, the United States suddenly offered assistance to Jordan--military equipment, including aircraft and tanks." The world views this U.S. proposal, he asserted, as a "desire by U.S. aggressive quarters to see Arabs fighting among themselves." A Soltan foreign-language commentary on the 28th claimed that American and British papers, shedding crocodile tears over the sufferings of the population, demand direct intervention, "this time on the pretext of granting aid to the Jordanian people." And Soltan, citing Packard as "announcing Washington's unexpected intention to grant military aid," also called this an expression of U.S. interest in provoking a war among Arabs.

SOVIET AID In the only available reference to Soviet assistance, Moscow's Arabic service reported on the 28th that the Soviet Red Cross had sent a cable to the Jordanian Red Crescent informing it that the Soviet organization had decided to give aid to the Jordanian inhabitants "who suffered as a result of recent events there," and that a six-man medical unit would be sent "in the near future," with medicines and medical equipment, two ambulances, and medical equipment for hospitals. The "Jordanian side's request" for food was "also being discussed," the broadcast said.

TASS on the 29th noted the arrival in Amman of Red Cross planes with medicines, food, and necessities for the Jordanian population, as well as the arrival of doctors "from other Arab countries."

BRITISH CP ON HUSAYN In keeping with its apparent effort to avoid blaming Husayn personally for the events in Jordan, TASS on the 24th in reporting a British CP statement on the situation failed to note that the party statement, as summarized in the party organ MORNING STAR, "condemned 'the brutal military attack launched by King Husayn and his generals.'" TASS cited the British CP's appeal to the British labor and progressive movement to oppose interference in Jordan by the United States, Britain, or Israel, but its account did not include the second point in the appeal to "stop the attacks on the Palestine liberation movement." In reporting a 17 September MORNING STAR editorial, TASS had also ignored the paper's charge that King Husayn's action in establishing a military government and proclaiming martial law "is directed against the Palestine guerrilla movement." Other MORNING STAR editorials, on the 21st and 23d, attacking Husayn and the military government were apparently not reported by TASS.

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MOSCOW ADVISES PALESTINIANS ON IMPORTANCE OF UNITY

In an Arabic-language commentary on the 28th approving the Jordanian-Palestinian agreement, Moscow again professes its "sympathy" with "every liberation movement," including the Palestinian, but at the same time lectures the Palestinians on the "vital" importance of unity of action. Another suggestion of Soviet concern over the direction and ties of some Palestinian groups comes in a KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA article on the 24th discussing the presence of "some doubtful persons" at a recent Palestinian seminar in Jordan.

The Arabic-language broadcast on the 28th pointed out that unlike previous Jordanian-Palestinian agreements, this one places the responsibility for establishing and maintaining normal relations between the Jordanian Government and the Palestinian fedayeen on "all Arab countries." It said the Cairo agreement demonstrates that the Arab leaders "are fully aware of the importance of the unity of their countries' action and that of the Palestinian resistance" in achieving victory in the struggle against Israel. They succeeded, it added approvingly, in "making reason override emotions" and managed to adopt resolutions that "put an end to disputes" weakening the Arab struggle.

The broadcast reiterated the Soviet view that the Palestinian patriots' struggle to recover their usurped national rights is lawful, and said the Soviets "understand the chief aims of the Palestinian liberation movement which defends the interests of more than 1.5 million Arabs" deprived of their homeland. Declaring that this is why the Soviets give the Palestinian movement "every support," the broadcast noted that Arafat and other fedayeen leaders have "more than once expressed thanks and gratitude" for the Soviet stand.

The commentary expressed the belief that with the conclusion of the agreement, "suitable conditions will prevail in Jordan to intensify the Palestinian liberation struggle against the aggressors." And here the broadcast issued some advice to the fedayeen: "This struggle also demands the realization of a unity of actions, not only among the Arab countries but, first of all, among the various Palestinian organizations." It called this unity of "vital importance" in that the Palestinians' enemies rejoice at differences among the Palestinian national organizations and also try to "magnify these differences artificially."

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KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
ON PALESTINE SEMINAR

An article by A. Aleksandrov in the 24 September KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA holds up the "second international conference on Palestine" recently held in Amman* to demonstrate the vigilance needed toward the intrigues of the Arab peoples' enemies. Aleksandrov recalled that the first such conference, held in 1965 in Cairo, attracted the attention of "the broad strata of the public of various countries," and that it was natural to expect that the organizers of the second conference would try to strengthen still more the solidarity with the Palestinian people's struggle. He complained, however, that "with the connivance of the conference organizers," in addition to the representatives of the "truly authoritative national and international organizations, some doubtful persons" were allowed to participate, "speaking on behalf of small and sometimes completely nonexistent organizations." From the first day, he said, "these people carried out a violent attack against the Soviet Union and the socialist and progressive Arab states."

Specifically, Aleksandrov mentioned the "representative of the so-called Belgian committee for solidarity with Palestine" as openly trying to form an anti-Soviet bloc at the conference. He recalled past "splitting activity" by this individual, identifying him as active in "various leftist-Trotskyite groupings" and as having organized a "so-called committee for solidarity with Palestine which consists only of about 20 of his friends." In addition, Aleksandrov said, "he is insinuating himself into the confidence of the leaders of the Palestinian movement." Aleksandrov recalled that this person organized a Palestinian solidarity conference in Algeria (such a conference was held in Algiers in late December 1969) which was a "disillusionment instead of a success." This time, according to Aleksandrov, the conference was "prepared particularly carefully," with the Belgian's closest assistant arriving a month in advance; the assistant "called himself a Palestinian, although he spoke Arabic with an obvious Israeli accent."

* Available Arab media reports of the sessions of the 2-6 September "international seminar on Palestine" in Amman do not identify the organizers of the conference. The reports outlined the speeches of some delegates--including a Fatah leader's criticism of attacks on the UAR and Soviet attitudes toward the U.S. peace initiative.

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Aleksandrov went on to recount the activities of the Belgian and his colleagues "from various countries," often "hiding behind assumed names and speaking from behind the masks of fictitious organizations," in organizing an anti-Soviet campaign.

The delegates from Czechoslovakia, the UAR, Italy, and other countries and organizations resolutely opposed the "provocateur trends" of "these persons," and were actively supported in this by "certain well-known leaders" of the Fedayeen, said Aleksandrov. But he concluded that it was necessary to "reflect profoundly on the fact that the new leadership of the Union of Palestinian Students was not able to make out in time what had happened" and to unmask and isolate these enemies of the Palestinian people.

PALESTINIAN REFUGEE QUESTION CALLED FUNDAMENTAL ISSUE

The events in Jordan have prompted at least two Moscow discussions of the "Palestinian issue." Nikolayev in his article in the 22 September IZVESTIYA called the settlement of the refugee problem "on the basis of satisfying their legal interests" one of the "fundamental conditions" for eliminating the crisis in the Middle East.* He recalled that "an important part" of the 1967 Security Council resolution pertained to this question, and that since 1948 the United Nations had adopted "several dozen resolutions" concerning the refugees, stipulating that they be returned to their homeland or compensated for their lost land and property. Because of Israel, Nikolayev said, not one of the resolutions has been implemented, and the problem has become more acute since the 1967 war, with the refugees now exceeding one million. But as in the last 20 years, Nikolayev added, "Israel refuses not only to resolve this vital question but even to start examining it in a business-like fashion." He concluded that lasting peace cannot be restored while injustice is done to the Palestinian people and they are being deprived of "all their national rights by the Israeli extremists."

In the course of an analysis of Jordanian events, panelists on the 27 September domestic service commentators' roundtable also touch on the Palestinian question. PRAVDA's Primakov

* For a discussion of other aspects of the Nikolayev article see the TRENDS of 23 September 1970, pages 25-26.

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estimated the number of refugees to be on the order of 2.5 million, and he also recalled that a UN resolution made it "Israel's duty" to allow the Palestinians who wish to return to their homeland to do so, and to compensate the rent for loss of their belongings. As a result of Israel's continued obstruction of the execution of the resolution, Primakov said, the Palestinian problem gravely "afflicts the people living in that part of the world."

IZVESTIYA observer Matveyev added that the unresolved nature of the Palestinian problem has given birth to the Palestinian movement, which began "in a practical way" after 1967. Matveyev called the Palestinian armed struggle "in general definitely justified in character," but observed that the movement "is not homogenous. It also contains extremist elements which preach terror as the basic direction of struggle." Matveyev added that the extremism of such elements "serves as a fine basis for the provocations by those foreign forces for whom Arab interests are alien," forces which, he said, want to foil any attempt at a peaceful settlement of the Middle East crisis. He charged that "U.S. imperialist circles" were trying to use the "extremism of these individual Palestinian groups" as a pretext for U.S. intervention in Jordan. He explained that he stressed the word "individual" since "in general these groups do not determine the nature of the Palestinian movement." Matveyev went on to assert that with the assistance of "reactionary and pro-Western elements in the Jordanian army," imperialist politicians have on "more than one occasion attempted to end the Palestinian movement as a whole."

LITERARY GAZETTE DISCUSSES ILLEGALITY OF HIJACKING

An article in the 23 September LITERARY GAZETTE is Moscow's first known discussion of the recent hijackings in the context of international law. The authors, candidates of juridical sciences Kolosov and Emin, pointed out that any deviation of an aircraft from its course threatens the danger of an air disaster. They noted that members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) were responsible for the recent seizure and destruction of four passenger aircraft, adding that "it must be stressed" that these actions were carried out in defiance of decisions of the Palestine resistance movement's central committee.

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Kolozov and Emin cited PFLP leader Habbash as saying "recently" that the seizure and destruction of the aircraft was "the PFLP's response 'to the criminal conspiracy aimed at liquidating the rights of the Palestinian people.'" While the justice of the struggle to restore the Palestinian people's "violated rights" is beyond dispute, the authors argued, armed struggle between warring sides "must not extend beyond the limits of the basic aim" of "suppressing the enemy's resistance." Actions in time of war, they said, may be performed only against the enemy's armed forces and not against the peaceful population, and they cited in this regard the 1907 Hague conventions and the 1949 Geneva convention on the protection of civilian populations in time of war.

The LITERARY GAZETTE article also pointed to the Tokyo convention of September 1963, which came into force in December 1969, as obliging the member state on whose territory a hijacked airliner lands to permit the passengers and crew as far as possible to continue their journey, while the aircraft and its cargo "must be returned to their legal owners." "As regard persons who are guilty of forcibly altering an airliner's course," the authors said, the Tokyo convention envisages the administration of justice by states in accordance with their own national legislation.

EVACUATION FROM JORDAN

Moscow's only known reference to the release of the hijacked passengers appears in the 28 September PRAVDA, in a dispatch filed by the paper's Cairo correspondent the previous day. The dispatch said that the PFLP declared in Amman on the 26th that it would free the remaining 38 passengers of civil aircraft "seized as hostages at the beginning of September." The evacuation of foreigners from Jordan has been mentioned in at least two instances, Yefremov commentaries in the domestic service on the 24th and 25th. In the first, Yefremov stated that both Husayn and the Palestinian partisans, "trying to prevent Washington from interfering," had given strict orders and taken measures to preserve the lives and property of foreigners. Yefremov added that the first evacuation "took place today," and thus the need to protect American citizens "doesn't exist, even as a pretext" for intervention. On the 25th, Yefremov cited news agencies as reporting that the evacuation of British subjects had been completed and that the Red Cross was bringing in food and medical supplies and taking out "Americans and other foreigners caught in Jordan by the present events."

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U.S. FAILURE TO PRESS ISRAEL ON JARRING TALKS DEPLORED

Moscow continues to complain of the "unseemly" and "hypocritical" U.S. role in encouraging the Israeli "extremists" and in failing to use its influence to prevent Israel's obstruction of the Jarring mission. TASS commentator Velichanskiy complained on the 26th, for example, that to have made the "Rogers plan" a really constructive step, Washington should have made efforts to impel Israel to give up its "aggressive plans," but it acted quite the opposite in committing itself to supply Israel with "offensive weapons" on favorable terms. PRAVDA's New York correspondents Kolesnichenko and Nekrasov similarly observed, according to TASS on the 29th, that after the Arab states, contrary to U.S. expectations, accepted the U.S. initiative, Washington "made a concession" to Tel Aviv, "supposedly for the purpose of 'calming Israel' and for preserving the contact with Jarring." After the agreement on cease-fire was achieved, the correspondents went on, Israel received a new consignment of weapons from Washington, and in a second step the State Department "'recognized the violation' of the cease-fire agreement" by the UAR. Thus the United States, they added, "wittingly or unwittingly" dealt a blow to the Jarring mission.

Comment repeatedly cites statements by Israeli leaders to demonstrate that Israel "never thought seriously about the benefits of contacts which might ultimately lead to peace." And propagandists quote Israeli statements following Mrs. Meir's talks in Washington to show that while Israel gained military and financial assistance, there was no pressure in turn for Tel Aviv to return to the Jarring talks. Thus Sturua, in the 22 September IZVESTIYA, said that U.S. assertions that the supplying of planes to Israel "pursued the aim of restoring contacts through UN channels in the framework of Jarring's mission" were refuted by Mrs. Meir's remark to U.S. Jews that President Nixon promised speedy financial and military aid "without demanding any concessions in return."

Propagandists employ convoluted arguments to associate the Jordanian events with Israel's refusal to participate in the Jarring contacts. According to Kolesnichenko in the 23 September PRAVDA, the more complex the situation in Jordan, "the more 'uncompromising' has been Tel Aviv's position with respect to the contacts with Jarring, and the greater Israel's 'prior demands' on the Arabs." An Arabic-language broadcast on the 24th claimed that Israel and its

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"American protectors" were endeavoring to exploit the events in Jordan to justify their unwillingness to make Jarring's mediation mission successful.

In discussing the stalled Jarring contacts, the roundtable panelists on the 27th speculated on Israel's intention in refusing to send its representative to the talks. Polyanov wondered if this meant that the Israeli position "bears witness to its intention of hanging on until 8 November"--the end of the three-month cease-fire period--"so as to renew military operations on the Suez Canal." Perhaps implying a Soviet interest in an extension of the cease-fire, panelist Primakov interjected that "all observers who are at all serious, including the United States," recognize that in that case the Middle East situation would immediately take on an even more serious character, and for a very understandable reason: larger forces than before would be put into action.

PEKING DEFENDS SYRIAN ROLE IN JORDAN CONFLICT

Peking's rivalry with the Soviets as part of its effort to cultivate the Arab radicals surfaced more clearly in connection with the question of Syrian participation in the Jordan fighting, an issue which the Chinese had carefully skirted during the first week of developments. A PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article dated 24 September--the second commentary on this level discussing the Jordan conflict--assailed Secretary Rogers' 20 September statement on Syrian intervention as designed to justify U.S. intervention in the conflict. After taking the position that Syria-based Palestinian forces had justifiably joined the fighting in Jordan, Commentator went on to defend Syria's right to "support"--the means were left undefined--the Palestinians in "their counterattack in self-defense."

Though it seems unlikely that the 24 September Commentator article was drafted in reaction to remarks by Podgorny and a Soviet Foreign Ministry report on the previous day suggesting Soviet pressure on Syria and others not to intervene in Jordan, Peking's decision to raise the issue of Syrian participation appears to be a move to score points at Moscow's expense as well as Washington's and to underscore Chinese support for the Arab radicals. An NCNA report dated the 24th, also keyed to Rogers' statement, brought out the anti-Soviet dimension of Peking's response in charging that the United States was working with "its [Soviet] co-plotter to bring diplomatic pressure to bear upon the Arab countries, Syria in particular." NCNA cited several Western reports indicating that the Soviets were seeking to exert influence on Syria.

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Characteristically, Peking has used Albanian comment to spell out the anti-Soviet implications. NCNA on the 26th released a ZERI 1 POPULLIT editorial of the 24th which described the Jordan conflict as the direct product of efforts by "the U.S. imperialists and the Soviet social imperialists to impose their joint plan" on the Arabs. The editorial denounced "the doublefaced stand" of the Soviets, who "pose as a neutral and make appeals for reconciliation" and who use their diplomatic influence to "directly exercise pressure on the Palestinians." Peking has not, in its own name, taken the opportunity to attack the Soviets for their effort to take a balanced position between the contending sides in Jordan.

Peking has also avoided direct attacks on King Husayn, but it has publicized criticism of the King from other sources. Thus, an NCNA dispatch datelined Cairo on the 27th quoted Sudanese President an-Numayri, back from Amman after leading a delegation to arrange a cease-fire, as charging that Husayn was an accomplice in a U.S.-Israeli plot to annihilate the Palestinian resistance movement. Peking has not mentioned the agreement signed in Cairo on the 27th designed to end the Jordan fighting.

BULGARIA, ROMANIA ISSUE STATEMENTS ON JORDAN

Bulgaria has followed East Germany as the second Soviet bloc regime to come out with an official statement on Jordan.* An authorized statement issued by BTA on 24 September called for an end to the fighting and said the Bulgarian Government was following with concern "the attempts of certain imperialist circles to put developments in Jordan to use for a direct military intervention in that country." Two days later, an article in Sofia's CTECHESTVEN FRONT cautioned that the crisis was not over but commented that the cease-fire and "the normalization--to a certain extent--of relations between the Jordanian regime and the Palestinian guerrillas will put an end to some of the sharpest elements of the current crisis."

The third of Moscow's East European allies to provide authoritative comment was Romania: An AGERPRES statement of 27 September broke Bucharest's silence on the Jordanian events,

* The ADN statement and official statements from Yugoslavia and Albania on 20 and 22 September, respectively, are reported in the 23 September TRENDS, pages 28-30.

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calling for "mutual understanding" to end the conflict and--
avoiding criticism of either side--declaring that the fighting
had "prejudiced the vital interests of the Jordanian and
Palestinian peoples." The statement declared that "any armed
intervention from outside would unavoidably lead to further
sharpening of the conflict "

Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary have not commented authoritatively
on the recent Jordanian events. At the routine level, Budapest MTI
commentator Reti on the 26th attributed the lessening of tension
and the cease-fire to the diplomatic efforts of Arab leaders and
"the consistent diplomatic activity of the Soviet Union," adding
that the threat of American intervention "seems to be receding."

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NIXON TRIP

Moscow has continued to focus on the Middle East in a substantial volume of press and radio comment on President Nixon's European trip. As in initial comment in the wake of the 15 September White House announcement of the trip, there are passing references to domestic political considerations. Some commentaries have also sought to portray the visit as Washington's reaction to the "trend toward detente" in the north of Europe. Soviet reportage on the President's first stop on 27 and 28 September, in Italy, gave characteristically wide play to the demonstrations against his visit.

Having acknowledged that Yugoslavia was on the itinerary, Moscow abstained from any comment on the Yugoslav leg of the tour as of the date of the President's arrival in Belgrade--a restraint also observed by the Soviet bloc allies in Eastern Europe, which generally echo the main themes of Moscow's comment on the trip. At least some East European comment on the Yugoslav visit may be anticipated after it is over: One Budapest radio commentary remarked that it was "interesting" that the President was going to Belgrade and that the visit might merit comment later. Romania has yet to comment on any aspect of the trip.

Peking coverage has been confined so far to two NCNA reports, on 27 and 28 September, on the demonstrations in Italy. The first dispatch said the President would review Sixth Fleet maneuvers designed as a show of strength and would "conspire in underhanded intrigues in conference with the U.S. representative in Israel, U.S. envoys in some Arab countries, and military chieftains of the North Atlantic aggressive bloc." Demonstrators in Milan, NCNA said, denounced "U.S. imperialism, Israeli Zionism, and [Soviet] social imperialism." Tirana has carried editorialized reports playing up hostile demonstrations and punctuated by rhetoric on the lines of the initial, 21 September commentary decrying the tour as a "counterrevolutionary plot" against the peoples of the Mediterranean area.

MOSCOW SEES TOUR AS SHOW OF FORCE IN MEDITERRANEAN

Soviet reaction so far is typified by the comment of NOVOSTI political observer Ardatovskiy, in IZVESTIYA on the 26th: "It looks like the United States is trying to counterpose increased

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military activity in the Mediterranean to changes aimed at improving the political climate on the continent." PRAVDA correspondent Vishnevskiy, in an international review in the paper on the 27th, cited the U.S. press for the observations that the trip "is not so much to Europe as to the regions where U.S. armed forces are stationed in Europe" and that the stopover in London would be "of secondary significance in comparison with his tasks in the Mediterranean region." A 28 September TASS report on that day's meeting between Presidents Nixon and Saragat, citing the New York TIMES, said President Nixon would devote more time to meetings with U.S. "brasshats" than to talks with Italian and British leaders and with Pope Paul.

A 29 September IZVESTIYA article by Sturua, reviewed by TASS, said the trip was motivated by two factors--the Arab-Israeli conflict and the "problem of oil"--and characterized it as an example of "gunboat diplomacy." According to Sturua, the tour is viewed in the United States as "an attempt to 'show the American flag from the Dardanelles to the Suez Canal.'" Other commentators interpreted the visit to the Sixth Fleet and the plans to observe fleet maneuvers on the 29th as "saber-rattling designed to underline the U.S. military presence in the Mediterranean and to demonstrate U.S. power and U.S. interests," as "blackmail" against the Arabs, and as support for Israel. Moscow's first acknowledgment of the President's 28 September order to cancel the maneuvers came in a brief TASS item at mid-day on the 29th, citing the Italian news agency ANSA. While this item did not mention the fact that the cancellation was prompted by the death of UAR President Nasir, a TASS report on the 30th included such an acknowledgment.

Commentators are unanimous in concluding that the trip will not have a calming effect on the situation in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. IZVESTIYA observer Polyanov, participating in the domestic service commentators' roundtable show on the 27th, said the visit to the Sixth Fleet would in fact have the opposite effect. In the same vein, a RED STAR article broadcast to Arab listeners on 25 September quoted UPI for the observation that the demonstration of U.S. power in the Mediterranean and the visit of the President would serve in no sense to reduce international tension. Ardatovskiy commented in IZVESTIYA that the tour was "planned for the eve of the UN jubilee session," concluding that speeches by U.S. representatives

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in that organization professing peaceloving aims will "sound bluntly pharisaical after the fit of militarism which Washington is now displaying in the Mediterranean."

In line with its focus on the President's alleged intent to flaunt the U.S. presence in the Mediterranean, propaganda points up the "satisfaction" in Athens over the "sudden decision to visit the Mediterranean region." Moscow has taken note of the recent Washington announcement that the United States will resume military deliveries to Greece and of the report that the "black colonels" in Greece have indicated their readiness to allow Greek airports to be used for the evacuation of U.S. civilians from the Near East and "possibly for other limited military purposes." While the President has not included Greece on his itinerary, Moscow says, Secretaries Laird and Rogers will be visiting both Greece and Turkey in October "to discuss joint efforts to support and strengthen NATO." Ardatovskiy in IZVESTIYA observed that the President's stopover in Spain would be in connection with last month's agreement on the renewal of U.S. leases on Spanish bases.

EAST EUROPEANS ECHO SOVIET LINE ON "GUNBOAT DIPLOMACY"

Initial East European reaction to President Nixon's tour has followed generally predictable lines, against the background of Moscow's criticisms and the fact that Belgrade is on the itinerary. Moscow's hardcore allies have generally seconded the Soviet line in terming the trip an exercise in "gunboat diplomacy" that runs counter to the Administration's contention that an era of negotiations has replaced the era of confrontation. The most hostile comment, characteristically, comes from the East German press, which denounces the trip as "a provocation," while Budapest displays the greatest restraint.

An East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND article on 26 September, entitled "Nixon's Luggage: Provocation," said that "the coincidence in timing regarding the Nixon trip and the military demonstration of the Sixth Fleet against the Arab peoples shows the scope of this provocation clearly." A followup commentary in the paper on the 29th, reviewed by ADN, observed that "at the first stop on his aggressive-provocative tour, the 'guest' from the White House and his imperialist policy of force suffered a rebuttal."

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A Prague Radio commentator on 28 September questioned the sincerity of "assurances" that the inspection of the Sixth Fleet was not linked with the Middle East crisis, concluding that President Nixon's trip "is obviously at odds with the efforts of the democratic forces on the European continent which are trying to create an atmosphere of trust and develop constructive, peaceful cooperation among all European nations."

Warsaw's TRYBUNA LUDU, also on the 26th, in an article entitled "Aircraft Carrier Diplomacy," said that "during the present tense situation in the Middle East, Washington is using the bankrupt diplomacy of aircraft carriers, despite logic and the strategic realities of the situation." According to PAP's review of the article, it added that "this is a peculiar commentary on the 'Rogers' plan, which assumed Washington's cooperation in getting a political settlement of the Middle East crisis."

Sofia's military daily NARODNA ARMIYA, in a 26 September article on the trip, blamed the President "for stubbornly continuing to follow the policy of exacerbating tension" in the Middle East and of "even returning to the times of the cold war" at a time when European detente is making progress.

Budapest media have so far approached the visit cautiously, carrying critical reportage but generally avoiding original comment. An MTI dispatch from New York on the 28th quoted American press sources for the view that the trip is a typical exercise in "gunboat diplomacy." Another MTI report on the same day said "it emerges from Rome dispatches from news agency correspondents that there was a cold welcome for the U.S. President."

BELGRADE UNDERSCORES ADHERENCE TO NONALINEMENT ON EVE OF VISIT

Yugoslav media heralded President Nixon's arrival with extensive propaganda, stressing the visit's "significance" while underscoring the idea that it implies no alteration in Yugoslavia's nonaligned policy. Radio Belgrade on the 29th, for example, after mentioning the "great importance" of the visit, observed defensively that any speculation that "a harmonization of the interests of Yugoslavia and the United States in their future bilateral cooperation is

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involved is completely misplaced." It added: "On this occasion, it is superfluous to convince anybody of the fact that we do not want to establish good relations with one country at the expense of fruitful cooperation with another."

An editorial in Zagreb's VJESNIK on the 26th noted that there are "serious differences" between the United States and Yugoslavia and that Belgrade has spoken out against U.S. policy in Vietnam, the Middle East, and other areas. But VJESNIK said these disagreements have not been "overly serious obstacles to normal relations" between the United States and Yugoslavia.

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SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

MOSCOW RESPONDS TO CHINESE ATTACK ON SOVIET-FRG TREATY

Peking's 13 September attack on the Soviet-FRG treaty provoked a volley of Soviet responses, including a PRAVDA article on 20 September which interrupted a long abstention from polemical rejoinders in the Moscow daily press. In a summer of marked restraint, Moscow largely confined its polemical responses to foreign broadcasts, mainly beamed to the Chinese, and to the Soviet weeklies. Peking's attack keyed to the sensitive German question prompted the Soviets to raise their level of response a notch and has elicited a show of solidarity between Moscow and East Berlin against Chinese probes of possible strains in their relations. A more explosive issue, that of the Sino-Soviet border dispute, also seems involved by implication and may have been a key factor in the recent exchange. In his conciliatory 28 August speech in Alma-Ata, Brezhnev had made a point of insulating Sino-Soviet relations from the German question, and the Soviets appear to have been rankled by what they regard as Peking's failure to show a corresponding forbearance.

The 20 September PRAVDA article, by V. Mikhaylov, discussed two groups opposing the Soviet-FRG treaty, identified as the "revanchists" in West Germany and the Chinese as shown in the 13 September PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article. After playing up similarities in the two groups' reactions, Mikhaylov linked Peking's position with its "war psychosis" and claimed that the Chinese had seized upon "imperialist propaganda's provocative allegations" that the Soviets had concluded the treaty to free their hands to intensify pressure on the PRC. Mikhaylov alluded to Brezhnev's speech in noting that Soviet leaders have made "clear statements about this slander by the imperialists." The PEOPLE'S DAILY article did not, in fact, raise this issue, though Peking transmitted Albanian comment which pressed the charge against Moscow.

A dispatch from Berlin published in the 23 September PRAVDA concentrated on the anti-Chinese rebuttal contained in a NEUES DEUTSCHLAND article the previous day rounding up international reaction to the treaty. The PRAVDA dispatch said the East German paper had delivered "a decisive rebuff" to Peking's charge that the treaty was a betrayal of the GDR's

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sovereignty and had stressed the close relations between the GDR and the Soviet Union. In a thrust at Peking's stand on border questions, the dispatch quoted NEUES DEUTSCHLAND's assertion that "every Marxist-Leninist must display a responsible attitude toward existing borders, particularly the borders of the socialist states."

An unsigned article in the weekly NEW TIMES (No. 38, dated 18 September) derided the Chinese for claiming to have discovered that the treaty acceded to West German annexation of the GDR--something which none of the Warsaw Pact states, the GDR included, had noticed. Charging that Peking was following the practices of reactionary elements in the FRG in seeking to drive a wedge between the Soviet Union and the GDR, the article said the world is aware of the "unanimity" of the countries in the socialist camp regarding the treaty. In rebuking the Chinese for lecturing about the dangers of West German militarism, the article pointedly observed that the Soviets are aware of the dangers posed by "the revanchist aspirations of some circles in the FRG and other states."

Apart from reflecting a desire to demonstrate closed ranks with the East Germans, Moscow's response, particularly in its allusions to the Sino-Soviet border dispute, suggests resentment over Peking's sharp attack on the treaty following Brezhnev's gesture of good will designed to clear the atmosphere for the Peking talks. Whether or not Peking was in fact motivated to denounce the treaty because of its implications for Sino-Soviet relations, Moscow chose to view the attack in this light and thereby in effect to warn Peking about adverse effects on bilateral relations. Moscow has not directly linked the Peking talks with the exchange over the treaty, however, and anti-Chinese polemics have again faded from the Moscow daily press.

BROADCASTS TO CHINA Moscow's broadcasts to the Chinese contain the usual assortment of polemical attacks on Peking's domestic and foreign policies, while continuing to avoid associating these policies with individual Chinese leaders except for occasional references to Mao Tse-tung's thought in the abstract. A favorite tactic is to quote a Chinese leader's remarks in the past praising cooperation with the Soviets--a device that serves both to needle the Chinese by playing their words back to them and to make a

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pitch for a resumption of relations which allegedly benefitted the Chinese. A broadcast in Mandarin on 20 September quoted without comment from a report by Chou En-lai to the National People's Congress 16 years ago which invoked the Sino-Soviet treaty and underscored the benefits derived from friendship with the Soviet Union. Moscow presumably timed the replay of this message to coincide with the preparations for a new session of the NPC announced by the CCP plenum communique early this month.

The 20 September broadcast quoting Chou fits with past signs of Moscow's special interest in the PRC premier as a possible moderating influence in the Sino-Soviet dispute. At the height of the cultural revolution Chou was spared the virulent polemical derision which the Soviets rained upon Mao, Lin Biao, Kang Sheng, and other members of the Peking hierarchy. Moscow's interest in Chou was signalled most notably when Brezhnev, in the course of a speech on 27 October 1969 endorsing the Peking talks which had opened a week earlier, made the unusual fraternal gesture of referring to Chou as "comrade."

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CEYLON

Publicity for the 7-14 September visit of a Ceylonese economic delegation to the PRC, featuring praise for Ceylon's "policy of independence and neutrality" and culminating in the announcement of an agreement on a loan to Ceylon, came against the background of increasingly warm Peking propaganda treatment of Mrs. Sirimawo Bandaranaike's leftwing United Front Government since midsummer. On the 14th the delegation went on to North Korea, which along with the DRV, the GDR, and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam was accorded full diplomatic recognition by the Bandaranaike regime this summer. It was the third Ceylonese delegation in a month to visit Pyongyang, which has welcomed the advent of a "people's government" in Ceylon.

KCNA on 22 September noted the delegation's departure by air the preceding day for an unnamed destination. Colombo's CEYLON DAILY NEWS had reported on 2 September that the group would visit the Soviet Union before returning home, but Bombay's PTI reported on 26 September that the head of the delegation had given a press conference in Colombo the preceding day "on his return from a 20-day official visit to China and North Korea."

Following some initial, approving comment on the United Front's victory in the 27 May elections, Moscow has confined its treatment of Ceylonese affairs to scattered reportorial coverage, focused on such regime actions as the termination of Peace Corps activities and suspension of diplomatic relations with Israel. Moscow announced the appointment of a new ambassador to Ceylon on 29 August.

PEKING WOOS BANDARANAIKE REGIME AFTER INITIAL CAUTION

Having cautiously withheld comment on this spring's Ceylon election campaign and on Mrs. Bandaranaike's upset victory in May,* Peking has continued to avoid coverage of purely domestic Ceylonese affairs but has given an increasing amount of publicity since mid-July to anti-Western actions

* Initial PRC reaction to Mrs. Bandaranaike's election is covered in the TRENDS of 15 July 1970, pages 41-43.

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by the Ceylonese Government and to proliferating PRC-Ceylon contacts. On 18 July, for example, NCNA noted Ceylon's decision to nationalize bunkering trade of three foreign oil companies, thereby removing "the last foothold of imperialist oil companies" in Ceylon. On 28 July it cited Parliament's resolution on the 21st to establish a constituent assembly to draft a new constitution that will declare Ceylon an "independent republic" and end its status as a member of the British Commonwealth. On 9 August it reported Ceylon's dismissal of 12 U.S. aid consultants, and on the 20th it took note of Mrs. Bandaranaike's decision to end U.S. training of Ceylonese military officers.

In the first of a succession of Peking reports of Chinese-Ceylonese contacts, NCNA on 2 August recounted a Chinese embassy reception for high-ranking guests in Colombo in honor of the 43d People's Liberation Army anniversary. Peking reported the return of a PRC ambassador to Ceylon on 12 August after an absence of nearly five years, during which diplomatic representation was confined to a charge d'affaires. On the same day the ambassador returned, according to an NCNA report of 13 August, a six-member Chinese technical team arrived in Colombo to assist in construction of the Bandaranaike Memorial International Conference Hall--"a symbol of the friendship between the governments and peoples of the two countries." NCNA did not mention that the project, in memory of the Prime Minister's late husband, S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, had been initially arranged in 1964 but was put on ice by the Chinese following the election victory of the United National Party in March 1965.

Besides reporting the activities of the ambassador and the technical team in Ceylon, Chinese media have recorded the visits to Peking of three Ceylonese delegations during September. According to NCNA, Mrs. Theja Gunawardhana, member of the Executive Committee of the Ceylon-China Friendship Association and president of the Ceylon Afro-Asian Solidarity Association, arrived in Peking on 30 August and met with Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien on 6 September before visiting other parts of China. Also on the 6th, Li gave a banquet in honor of the speaker of Ceylon's House of Representatives, Stanley Tillekeratne, who had just completed a 10-day visit to North Korea.

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Following the arrival on the 7th of the Ceylonese economic delegation headed by the minister of foreign and internal trade "for a friendly visit at the invitation of the Chinese Government," NCNA provided extensive coverage of the delegation's activities, including an 8 September banquet given for the group by Li Hsien-nien. The featured speaker, Fang Yi, minister of the Commission for Economic Relations with Foreign Countries, praised Mrs. Bandaranaike's leadership for "continuing to pursue the policy of independence and neutrality" formulated by her late husband and for "upholding a just stand and opposing the imperialist policies of aggression and war, thus winning favorable comments from the progressive public opinion of various countries." At another banquet on the 11th, NCNA reported Fang Yi's expression of admiration for Ceylon's pursuit of "a foreign policy of independence and neutrality which upholds national dignity."

Following a meeting with Chou En-lai and the signing of a loan agreement on the 12th,* the economic delegation received "a warm send-off" as it departed on the 14th for the next stop on its economic shopping-tour, Pyongyang.

NORTH KOREA RELISHES RECOGNITION, EXTENDS ECONOMIC AID

Following a spate of publicity hailing the establishment of full diplomatic relations in mid-July, North Korean media gave extensive coverage to the 27 August-10 September visit of the Ceylonese parliamentary delegation headed by Stanley Tillekeratne, who went on to Peking on the 6th, and to the 15-21 September visit of the economic delegation.

* NCNA gave no details on the loan. The Bombay PTI reported on the 26th, quoting the head of the delegation at a press conference upon his return, that the agreement provides for an interest-free loan of about 22 million yuan, repayable over a 10-year period, for the purchase of rice during 1970. Chou En-lai also promised future aid, credit, and technical assistance for Ceylon, according to PTI.

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A press communique issued by the parliamentary delegation, carried by Pyongyang's KCNA on the 13th, stated that the establishment of diplomatic relations "will open a new chapter in the friendly relations between our two countries" and noted that this "first official parliamentary delegation" to visit any country "after the advent of a people's government to power" in Ceylon would make a positive contribution to Korean-Ceylonese relations. On the 16th KCNA cited the Korean foreign trade minister's comment at a banquet for the economic delegation the day before that Mrs. Bandaranaike's May election victory was "an event of great significance" and "a big blow at the imperialists headed by the U.S. imperialists and domestic reactionaries." The Ceylon economic delegation successfully arranged trade and scientific and technical cooperation agreements and protocols on economic and technical cooperation and on commodity exchange with the DPRK, according to KCNA on 22 September.

KCNA has also reported the visit to Pyongyang of a "socialist women's delegation" from Ceylon in late August and is currently publicizing the visit of the vice president of the Ceylon Journalists Association.

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BURMA - PRC

HEAD OF RESIDENT BURMESE CP MISSION RETURNS TO PEKING

Following an apparent absence from Peking of more than four months,* the head of the Communist Party of Burma's resident delegation in the PRC, Thakin Ba Thein Tin, was reported by NCNA on 30 September to have been among "foreign friends" present at a Sino-Albanian basketball exhibition in Peking on that date. NCNA identified him--as it had done prior to his unexplained absence--as "head of the delegation of the Central Committee of the CPB and vice chairman of the CPB Central Committee."

Since Ba Thein Tin's last reported public appearance in Peking on 21 May, the CPB has been represented at Peking functions by Thakin Pe Tint, "member of the delegation of the Central Committee of the CPB and member of its Central Committee." Although prior to that NCNA often noted the presence of both Ba Thein Tin and Pe Tint in their respective capacities as head and member of the CPB delegation, as it did in recounting the 21 May Peking rally in honor of Mao's 20 May statement, the current report does not mention Pe Tint.

* See the TRENDS of 8 July 1970, page 43.

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LUNA 16

USSR PUBLICIZES BREAKTHROUGH, SPECULATES ON PLANETARY FLIGHTS

In a substantial volume of propaganda, Moscow has hailed the flight of Luna 16, launched 12 September, as a "new outstanding success" and a "breakthrough" in the exploration and conquest of outer space.* On the 20th the unmanned craft made a soft descent to the lunar surface, where Soviet announcements say it drilled into the surface and scooped out rock samples which were automatically placed in an airtight container for return to Earth. The craft took off from the moon on the 21st and landed at the "pre-set" area in the USSR on 24 September.

Spokesmen for the Soviet scientific community have predictably utilized the exploit to press the line that automatic devices represent the most practical means for space exploration. Their statements stress the relatively low cost, which in the words of Academician Petrov on the 24th is one-twentieth to one-fiftieth that of a manned craft. Also mentioned are the weight factor and the lack of risk to human life. In the latter connection, there are reminders of the April flight of Apollo 13 which nearly resulted in loss of the crew after a "petty mishap." In an interview over the Moscow domestic service on 24 September, Soviet astronomer Martynov observed that the Apollo craft had to return empty-handed because of the danger to the lives of the crew members. By contrast, he said, the sending of an automatic craft lays no burden on anyone's conscience and requires no training of crew members.

Now as in the past, however, Soviet spokesmen concede the need for some manned flights. Martynov took note of the fact, for example, that a crew can take initiative on landing on a foreign body, where an automatic device can do only those tasks for which it was programmed. Academician Petrov, in an article in SOCIALIST INDUSTRY on 22 September, said that the argument over manned

* Radio Moscow devoted nearly 900 items to Luna 16 in the week ending 27 September--more than 23 percent of total broadcast comment. This substantial volume, however, falls short of the amount of publicity Moscow normally gives its manned flights; and the first two Luna-series flights--in January and September 1959--drew somewhat more propaganda fanfare than this one.

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versus unmanned craft is "insufficiently substantiated" because both have a role in space exploration. And in a 22 September IZVESTIYA interview, reported by TASS, Petrov said that "short-duration visits by man appear to be useful" in exploration of the moon; he went on to endorse the idea of a near-moon manned orbiting station from which the crew could descend to the moon's surface for scientific research. Soviet astronomer Vsekhsvyatskiy, in an interview in PRAVDA summarized by TASS on the 27th, commented that the success of automatic devices "is not at all indicative that exploration with the help of piloted ships is getting out of date."

PROGNOSIS FOR SPACE PROGRAM Characteristically, comment on the Luna 16 mission dwells on the future tasks of the Soviet space program in broad terms, avoiding any commitment to a timetable. TASS scientific commentator Nestorov, among others, restated on the 28th the USSR's concern for developing near-earth manned orbital laboratories, calling the prospects for such stations "promising" and noting the benefit that would accrue to the national economy.

Other spokesmen have suggested the possibility of exploring planets with devices similar to Luna 16. Thus Vsekhsvyatskiy in PRAVDA on the 27th said that Luna 16 and Venus 7, which is on its way toward that planet, are prototypes of devices for future space exploration and that automatic means of exploration are in the offing in "a kind of grand round of space flights to giant planets of the Jupiter type, which is undoubtedly to come in the foreseeable future." In an IZVESTIYA interview on the 25th, reported by TASS, the unidentified "chief designer" of Luna 16 said he believes automatic stations will play the main role in the exploration of planets "in the foreseeable future." And Martynov, in the 24 September radio interview, stated that the quality of Soviet equipment is steadily increasing and that "one would think that in a few years, say 3, 5, or 10--I do not intend to be a prophet--experiments [similar to Luna 16] could be conducted on Mars or Mercury."

Soviet scientists, including Petrov and the designer of Luna 16, have also mentioned the possibility of establishing an automatic observatory on the moon. According to Petrov in the 24 September interview, the moon will provide a "convenient base" for such an observatory and for carrying out "different technical and biological experiments."

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Soviet propaganda media have given wide play to the worldwide praise for the Luna flight, including congratulatory comment from the United States. IZVESTIYA on the 29th carries the text of President Nixon's message to Podgornyy. And TASS on the 23rd reported that acting NASA chief Low called the flight a "breakthrough" and noted his observation that "in the opinion of many experts, flights of unmanned spaceships to the moon and other planets are the most rational method of probing the solar system." Available Soviet comment has not, however, broached the matter of cooperation with the United States.

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